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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between the abstract concept of sovereignty and actual 
state decision making on foreign policy. Debates continue on the concept of sovereignty, the 
criteria on the basis of which (the degree of) sovereignty should be established and on the 
usefulness of the concept in an ever globalizing world. But how is sovereignty actually related to 
the analysis of ‘who rules’ in particular empirical foreign policy domains?  
 Taking the classical distinction between internal sovereignty and external sovereignty as 
the point of departure, this paper moves on to claim that an additional distinction between 
authority and autonomy is necessary in order to analyze the relation between (aspects of) 
sovereignty and its potentially predictable consequences for who rules. While authority is a 
relatively static concept rooted in judicial rights, autonomy is a dynamic variable on the basis of 
which a relationship can be established with the relative importance of domestic and international 
considerations in decision making on foreign policy. Abstract concepts of sovereignty, authority 
and autonomy are thus linked up with empirical analysis. 
 After introducing the concept of sovereignty and highlighting relevant conceptual debates 
(Section I), this paper elaborates a theoretical model in which the structural variables of internal 
polarity (i.e. the degree of concentration of power in the hands of the government relative to 
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society) and external polarity (i.e. the degree of power concentration in the international system) 
are introduced as the main variables influencing autonomy (Section II). Based on variations in 
degrees of autonomy, expectations are formulated on its effect on foreign policy decision making, 
particularly on the relative importance of domestic and international considerations in this 
process. In Section III, the theoretical framework is applied to French and German preference 
formation regarding the 1988 CAP-reform and the Uruguay Round of GATT-negotiations 
between 1990 and 1993. These case-studies, which offer variation on both internal and external 
polarity, provide a preliminary test of the theoretical framework set out in Section II. 
  
I. SOVEREIGNTY, AUTHORITY AND AUTONOMY 
 
Sovereignty can be regarded ‘an essential characteristic of the (modern) state’ (Van Kersbergen, 
1999: 74; see also Amilleri and Falk 1992, Held 1995, Stirk and Weigall 1995, Jackson 1999). 
The ‘core element in any definition of sovereignty’ is ‘the assertion of authority within a given 
territory’ (Krasner, 1988: 86). A distinction is commonly made between internal sovereignty 
(also called domestic hierarchy or territorial integrity) and external sovereignty (also called 
international anarchy or independence). Internal sovereignty means that ‘with respect to its 
territory and the population living on it, a state recognizes no authority other than its own’ (Van 
Kersbergen, Lieshout and Lock, 1999: 12) and thus connotes ‘supreme authority over a 
population inhabiting a territory’ (Aalberts, 2006: 16). A very general conceptualization of 
external sovereignty is the ‘lack of overarching authority structures in international relations’ 
(Aalberts, 2006: 16), ergo international anarchy. A more agency-focused conceptualization of 
external sovereignty is that ‘a state recognizes no authority above it in its relations with other 
states’ (Lieshout, 1999: 14). 
Although authors are mostly in agreement on these general concepts of internal and 
external sovereignty, divergences arise when it comes to more specific conceptualizations of 
what sovereignty entails and which criteria should be applied to measure (the existence or the 
degree of) sovereignty. The differences in definitions and criteria to a large extent explain the 
variation in claims regarding the extent to which states can still be regarded to be sovereign and 
hence with respect to the usefulness of the concept of sovereignty within the field of International 
Relations. For realists, the essence of sovereignty is ‘the state’s ability to make authoritative 
decisions’ (Thomson, 1995: 213). According to Thomson (1995, 215) state-centric theories such 
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as realism ‘are built on the assumption that states are, by definition, sovereign’ (see also Aalberts 
(2006: 49). Their analysis focuses on the outcomes of interactions between these sovereign states. 
In contrast, liberal interdependence theorists (e.g. Keohane and Nye, 1972; Rosecrance, 1986) 
from the 1970s onwards argued that ‘state sovereignty was being eroded by economic 
interdependence, global-scale technologies, and democratic politics’ (Thomson, 1995: 215). 
More recently these arguments have been couched in terms of the adverse effects of globalization 
and (European) integration on state sovereignty (for a discussion and reply see van Kersbergen, 
1999). On the one hand, liberal interdependence theorists defining sovereignty in terms of ‘the 
state’s ability to control actors and activities within and across borders’ (Thomson, 1995: 213), 
conclude that state sovereignty has diminished. On the other hand, theorists focusing on 
sovereignty as the claim of authority would conclude that globalization and regional integration 
have not diminished state sovereignty, but merely a state’s decision making autonomy. Clearly, 
variation in the definitions of and criteria for sovereignty explain these contradictory conclusions.  
Based on the literature, a distinction thus can be made between sovereignty as authority – 
‘the claim to exclusive right to make rules’ (Thomson, 1995: 223) – and sovereignty as (degree 
of) control or capacity – ‘capability of enforcing that claim’ (Thomson, 1995: 223).223). The 
latter essentially boils down to state autonomy: the ability of state and government to formulate 
and exert their own policies independent of the influence of other domestic and international 
actors. A number of authors argue that control should not be regarded a criterion for sovereignty. 
Van Kersbergen (1999: 74; for a similar argument see Thomson, 1995) notes that sovereignty 
‘will always remain to a large extent an aim, an aspiration or a claim of the ruling elite rather than 
an accomplished goal’. Sovereignty thus does not equal absolute power for state and government 
and the ability to do whatever they wish within their territory, let alone in their foreign policies. 
In a similar vein, Aalberts (2006: 19) warns against the ‘common misinterpretation of 
sovereignty: that it entails absolute power control or freedom’ as this ‘confuses authority with 
power and control’ and ‘conflates internal and external dimensions of sovereignty’. Hedley Bull’s 
thoughts on sovereignty, however, seem to include both authority and autonomy as criteria for 
sovereignty: Sovereignty ‘as a right [that] has to be claimed, recognized and exercised’ (Aalberts, 
2006: 56-57). I would argue that when it comes to answering the question “Who rules?” in a 
particular empirical domain, both authority and autonomy are concepts of importance and a clear 
distinction can be maintained between these concepts, irrespective of the question whether 
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autonomy should be regarded a criterion for sovereignty or not. The latter would be important in 
scientific studies aiming to contribute to a widening or deepening of the conceptual debate on 
sovereignty. However, it is beside the point in this paper as my aim is not to problematize the 
concept of sovereignty itself, but rather to focus on the relation between authority and autonomy 
on the one hand and state decision making with regard to foreign economic policy on the other 
hand.1 Suffice to say, therefore, that this paper takes the following assumptions with respect to 
sovereignty as the point of departure: 
 
1. The distinction between internal and external sovereignty. 
2. The distinction between authority and autonomy, irrespective of the question whether 
autonomy should be regarded a necessary condition for sovereignty or not. 
3. Globalization and regional integration mainly have an impact on decision making 
autonomy, but leave state authority largely intact (for a discussion see Van Kersbergen, 
1999). 
 
Although the state is the highest authority at the international level, it is not likely to take just any 
action it wishes. States are (or at least act as if they are) bound by the treaties they have signed, 
the international organizations they brought into being, and the importance they attach to their 
reputation This can be expected to be the case particularly when states have delegated specific 
parts of their authority to international institutions. With respect to GATT (General Agreement of 
Tariffs and Trade) negotiations for example, European member states have delegated negotiating 
authority to the European Commission. Nevertheless, the Commission acts on the basis of a 
mandate from the Council of Ministers and a final trade accord has to be met with a qualified 
majority in the Council (de jure, while these decisions are usually taken unanimously de facto). 
In effect, states operate under constraints in the international system and can be expected to take 
account of other actors in the international arena. In other words the decision making autonomy 
of states (state autonomy or external autonomy) is not likely to be absolute. 
                                                 
1
 This does not mean that sovereignty itself is bracketed out of the analysis, as particularly the degree of autonomy is 
an important variable in the analysis in this paper and cannot be regarded as static and given. Nevertheless, this 
paper does not address or enter into the thought-provoking debate instigated in the constructivist literature in which 
the constitutive nature of sovereignty - sovereignty as constitutive of states and the concept of sovereignty itself, in 
turn, constituted by states (sovereignty is what states make of it) -  is emphasized (see for example Aalberts (2006) 
on the continuity of sovereignty within change of both the circumstances and sovereignty itself). 
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 At the domestic level, the government is the highest authority. Again, this does not imply 
that the government is free to act as it wishes. Although the government holds authority over its 
population, it is dependent on societal recognition of its claim of the legitimate exercise of 
authority and it is politically accountable to its population. Therefore, governments (at least in 
democratic states) cannot simply ignore the wishes of societal actors when they decide on foreign 
policy, even thought the government may have sole decision making authority in many foreign 
policy domains. In effect, governments face domestic constraints and are likely to take account of 
the wishes of societal actors to a certain extent. In other words the decision making autonomy of 
governments (governmental or internal autonomy) is not likely to be absolute. 
 In effect, when we ask the question ‘Who rules?’ with respect to foreign economic policy 
(to the extent that decision making authority has not been completely delegated to international 
institutions), the answer must be that eventually the state/government decides, but within both 
domestic and international constraints. In order to explain and potentially predict the influence of 
international (foreign states, IO’s) and societal actors (interest groups, parliament), it is important 
to establish which variables influence the strength of the international and domestic constraints 
and hence state and governmental autonomy respectively. I claim that state autonomy and 
governmental autonomy are constrained and that the degrees of these constraints vary with two 
structural variables: the polarity of the domestic system (i.e. the degree of concentration of power 
in the hands of the government relative to society, also referred to as ‘domestic structure’ or 
‘state-society relations’); and the polarity of the international system (i.e. the degree of power 
concentration in the international system). I expect that different combinations of power relations 
at the two levels of analysis amplify and modify international and domestic constraints 
differently and therefore influence the freedom of manoeuvre or autonomy of state and 
government. External polarity influences the degree to which states need to take account of other 
international actors, and thus the degree to which state autonomy is limited. Internal polarity 
influences the degree to which governments need to take account of the wishes of different 
domestic actors and thus the degree to which governmental autonomy is limited. The theoretical 
notions underpinning these claims will now be elaborated. 
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II INTERESTS, POLARITY AND AUTONOMY 
 
 
State and governmental interests 
 
Before elaborating on the variation in degrees of state and governmental autonomy and their 
effect on foreign policy decision making, we first need to establish the state and governmental 
interests which are assumed to lie at the basis of foreign policy decisions. The State operates 
within a more or less uncertain environment within which it, first of all, has to take care of its 
survival2. A distinction can subsequently be made between the external and the internal interests 
of the State, or between the interest of the state to survive in the international system and the 
interests of the government to survive in the domestic system. As a consequence, the preference 
ordering of foreign policy alternatives and hence foreign policy itself depends on the expected 
effects of the different alternatives on the interest in survival of the State.3 Van der Vleuten 
(2001:50) has introduced a useful distinction between three important dimensions of the interest 
in survival: a political, economic and ideological dimension (see also Bull, 1977 (1995ed):63).  
The political dimension of the national interest essentially covers the relative power 
position of the state and its government. For the government this implies that its objective is to 
remain in office, and for the state it implies safeguarding its power position vis-à-vis other states 
in the international system. Apart from this material aspect, the State’s political interest also 
includes an immaterial, less tangible feature: the State’s credibility. Credibility may be regarded 
as a dimension of power, which is indicated by a state’s reputation for keeping its promises and 
executing its threats. Wealth is the central aspect of the economic dimension of state interests. 
Applied to trade issues, this implies that states aim at safeguarding their share in world markets 
by tuning international trading agreements to their institutional trade opportunities. States will 
prefer liberalization in sectors in which they have a comparative advantage, and they will prefer 
protectionism in sectors in which they produce relatively inefficiently. In addition, the concept of 
                                                 
2
 In the remainder of this paper, I distinguish between the state as an actor in the international system and the state as 
an actor in the domestic system. The former will be referred to as ‘state’, and the latter will be referred to as 
‘government’. The term State is reserved for the state as a mental construct: the State that has to weigh its external 
(state) interests and its internal (governmental) interests in the process of preference-formation. 
3
 Underlying this statement is the assumption that actors are rational, which means that they decide as if they have 
ordered the expected outcomes of the behavioural options subjectively available to them on the basis of the expected 
utility  they attach to these outcomes. Actors are assumed to be utility maximizing and thus to prefer the option with 
the highest expected utility attached to it. 
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institutional trade opportunities also refers to the degree to which a certain state is dependent on 
the stability a transparent, well-organized trading system provides. Domestically, governments 
are interested in a stable development of economic indicators like GDP and employment. Finally, 
the ideological dimension of the national interest touches upon national role-perceptions, 
principles and paradigms. There are certain roles a particular state wishes to play in the 
international system: take for example France’s vocation exportatrice in the area of agriculture 
(cf. Fouilleux, 1996:52). Governments wish to safeguard the principles and paradigms on which 
their policy is based. Small scale family farming is such a Leitmotiv in German politics 
(Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 1988). A summary of these 
different dimensions of a State’s domestic and international interests is provided in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Dimensions of the interests in survival of state and government 
 
EXTERNAL INTERNAL 
 
Political material interest 
Defending the relative power position of 
the state. 
 
Political immaterial interest  
Defending the state’s credibility. 
 
Political material interest 
Remaining in office (re-election). 
 
 
Political immaterial interest 
Defending the government’s credibility. 
 
Economic interest 
Tuning international trading agreements 
to the state’s institutional trade 
opportunities. 
 
Economic interest 
Maximizing national economic indicators: 
state budget, GNP, employment etc. 
 
Ideological interest 
Safeguarding the ‘role’ the state wishes 
to play in the international system. 
 
Ideological interest 
Defending the government’s policy 
principles and paradigms. 
 
I assume that in the process of preference formation before making foreign policy decisions, the 
effects of each (subjectively available) behavioural option on the different dimensions of the 
State’s interests are considered. This process results in an ordering of behavioural options or, put 
differently, a preference. I further assume that behavioural options can have three sorts of effects 
for each of the State interests: neutral effects; positive effects (contributing to the State interest); 
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or negative effects (damaging the State interests).4 The importance the State is likely to attach to 
the different aspects of its interest varies with state and governmental autonomy. 
 
Internal polarity and governmental autonomy 
Internal polarity refers to the degree to which power is concentrated within the state.5 It 
essentially focuses on the power of the government in relation to society.6 The greater the 
capability of the government to impose its will on societal actors (or to pursue policies against the 
will of these societal actors), the higher the internal polarity (Van der Vleuten, 2001:39). A 
relatively high internal polarity thus implies a relatively high degree of governmental autonomy. 
Due to this high degree of governmental autonomy, the State can afford to be relatively 
insensitive to societal demands and will be better able to take account of demands of external 
actors. Thus, the relative weight a State attaches to its external interests increases as internal 
polarity increases (and governmental autonomy with it). Based on Van der Vleuten (2001:39-49), 
I use three institutional factors to estimate the internal polarity: First of all, the degree to which 
power is centralized within the state; Secondly, power relations between government and 
parliament; And, finally, the system of interest mediation. 
The degree of centralization of power within the state affects governance capability as it 
indicates the degree to which the consent of lower levels of government is required in order for 
the central government to be able to take policy-decisions. In a unitary state, the degree of 
centralization is high and in a federal state, the degree of centralization is low. Furthermore, in 
presidential systems, the degree of centralization is high if the president and the prime minister 
belong to the same political party and low if they belong to different political parties. The more 
                                                 
4
 The negative and positive effects on different dimensions of the State interest can be termed costs and benefits 
respectively. In the process of preference formation, the State decides on the basis of its perception of the costs and 
benefits it attaches to different behavioural options. 
5
 Following Van der Vleuten (2001), I use the term polarity, because it can be applied both at the domestic and at the 
international level, indicating the degree to which power is concentrated in the hands of the government at the former 
level, and indicating the degree to which power is concentrated in the hands of a small number of states at the latter 
level. As such, it is derived from Waltz’s third characteristic of ‘structure’, which is the distribution of capabilities 
across the units of the system. (Waltz, 1979:81-81).  I am aware that the term polarity is not commonly used in this 
sense and that my understanding of internal polarity closely resembles what is often labeled the distinction between 
weak and strong states (e.g. Krasner, 1978) in Comparative Politics literature, or state-society relations in the 
domestic structure literature. With respect to the former, I would argue that the terminology is less appropriate in IR 
literature and could easily be confused with a reference to the relative power of a state in the international system 
(Mastanduno et al, 1998 use the terms weak and strong state in that sense for example). The term state-society 
relations fails to capture the structural character of the variable. 
6
 With the term society, I refer to domestic non-state actors, including corporatist actors and societal movements 
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decision-making power is centralized, the higher the internal polarity, while the less decision-
making power is centralized, the lower the internal polarity.  
Executive-legislative relations affect governance capabilities as they indicate the degree to 
which parliament constitutes a veto-player for the government. In case of coalition governments 
or single-party majority governments (with a stable majority in parliament), executive-legislative 
relations are characterized by an executive-legislative balance. In case of minority governments, 
these relations are legislative-dominated. Furthermore, in bicameral parliamentary systems, 
executive-legislative relations are characterized by an executive-legislative balance if the 
government has a stable majority in both the upper and the lower chamber and executive-
legislative relations are legislative-dominated if the government has a minority or merely a 
narrow majority in either of the two chambers. To the extent that the relations between 
government and parliament are more balanced, internal polarity increases. To the extent that 
these relations are legislative-dominated, internal polarity decreases, as parliament constitutes a 
veto-player, which negatively affects governance capabilities. 
The degree to which interest mediation is institutionalized affects governance capacity, as it 
indicates the degree to which societal groups can block the policies proposed by government. 
When the degree of institutionalization is high, we speak of a corporatist  method of interest 
mediation, and when the degree of institutionalization is low, the method of interest 
intermediation is labeled pluralist. The former method places the societal groups involved in a 
veto-player position (Tsebelis, 1995:308). Thus, it follows that the higher the degree of 
institutionalization of interest mediation, the lower the internal polarity. A pluralist method of 
interest representation does not provide societal groups with veto-power (Nordlinger, 1981:157; 
Culpepper, 1993:306). Apart from the fact that these groups lack formal decision-making power, 
the ‘presence of several competing interests could in principle mean that they will prevent one 
another from realizing their interests directly’ (Van Waarden, 1992:44). Therefore, the lower the 
degree of institutionalization of interest mediation, the higher the internal polarity  
Taking together the ‘scores’ of a state on the three indicators, we can establish whether 
internal polarity is low or high. Table 2 indicates the scores from high polarity (3) to low polarity 
(0).  As governmental autonomy increases with increasing internal polarity, it follows that the 
higher the score in table 2, the higher the degree of governmental autonomy. 
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Table 2: Internal institutional indicators and internal polarity 
 
 High degree of centralization Low degree of centralization 
 
Executive -legislative          Legislative-                    
balance                                 dominated 
Executive -legislative          Legislative-                    
balance                                 dominated 
Pluralism 3 2 2 1 
Corporatism 2 1 1 0 
 
 
Internal polarity provides information on the degree of governmental autonomy, in short its 
general ability to ignore societal demands, and about the general ability of society to influence 
the government. In case of high domestic polarity, society will need to exert far more pressure in 
order to influence the government than in case of low domestic polarity.7 Apart from the 
structural variable of internal polarity, a number of process variables need to be introduced which 
also influence governmental autonomy. These variables influence the costs and benefits societal 
actors are able to produce for the government and thus the internal constraints on governmental 
decision making.  
Societal mobilization, societal resources and governmental sensitivity influence the 
domestic political costs and benefits attached to different behavioural options. To a certain extent, 
mobilization is a prerequisite for societal influence, notwithstanding the possibility that the 
government anticipates on societal preferences and pressure. As levels of mobilization increase, 
the political costs or benefits of an option increase. In order for societal groups to mobilize, a 
policy proposal must affect their interests, and provide substantial benefits or induce high costs 
(Milner, 1997:63). As long as societal mobilization is unidirectional – the mobilized societal 
groups confronting the government with similar demands – increased mobilization is likely to 
lead to an increase in societal influence. However, once mobilization becomes multidirectional, 
indicating lack of unity on the part of society, this will be detrimental to the influence of society 
in the process of preference formation, because it increases the government’s room for 
manoeuvre and thus its autonomy. The more resources a group has at its disposal, the more likely 
this group will be able to influence the process of preference formation by effectively producing 
internal political costs and benefits and the less likely the government is able to ignore this group. 
Finally, when a government is more sensitive, governmental autonomy decreases, and the 
government needs to attach greater importance to its internal political interests (and thus take 
                                                 
7
 This corresponds with what Skidmore and Hudson (1993:8-9) call the weak statist view, which argues that ‘if [a] 
state is strong and insulated (…), then societal opposition can be ignored, at least until it reaches very high levels’. 
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account of societal pressure). The sensitivity of the government increases if the government has a 
weak position in parliament and when elections are pending (Van der Vleuten, 2001:53). 
 
External polarity and state autonomy 
 
The structure of the international system constrains and enables states, making certain policy 
options more attractive to them than others. These constraints vary with the degree to which 
power is concentrated within the international system (external polarity). External polarity 
indicates the distribution of power between the states in the international system, in the same 
manner that internal polarity indicated the power relations between the government and societal 
actors in the domestic system. External polarity increases as power in the international system is 
more concentrated or, in other words, distributed more unequally (Lieshout, 1999:18). External 
polarity affects the stability of power relations and thereby the degree to which states need to take 
account of their external interests. The more unstable the power relations in the system are, the 
more the State needs to take account of its external interests if it wishes to survive. External 
polarity thus influences the degree to which states need to take account of the demands of foreign 
states and IO’s (external interests), as well as the degree to which states have leeway to take 
societal demands into account (internal interests). In other words: External polarity affects state 
autonomy.8 
 The virtue of the ‘inequality of states’ is that it ‘makes peace and stability possible’ 
(Waltz, 1979:132). Bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar systems. If the number of 
poles within the international system increases, ‘the level of decision-making uncertainty about 
the consequences of particular actions in the international arena increases’ as well (Bueno de 
Mesquita, 1978:243). As a result of the flexibility of alliances, power relations in multipolar 
systems are less stable than power relations in bipolar systems. In multipolar systems, the 
‘tendency of coalitions to gain and lose partners’ makes the ‘resolve of opposing states and also 
                                                 
8
 Skidmore (1994) emphasizes the variable of state power as indicative of the degree to which a certain state is 
constrained by its external environment. I agree that the external environment imposes different constraints on 
superpowers than on middle powers, the former having more policy options available to them. However, I would add 
that the policy options of a certain state in a multipolar system (low polarity) – irrespective of its particular position 
within the international system - also differ from the policy options available to that state in a bipolar system (high 
polarity). 
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the size and strength of opposing coalitions (…) hard to calculate’ (Mearsheimer, 1990b:37). 
Furthermore, superpowers in a bipolar system have a greater interest in and feel more responsible 
for maintaining the status quo than great powers in a multipolar system (Lieshout, 1995:180). 
Consequently, in a bipolar system, middle powers and small powers can rely on the intervention 
of superpowers in defense of their territory, while, in a multipolar system, they have to rely on 
their own efforts to a greater extent. We may conclude that a bipolar system (and the relative 
power positions of states within that system) is relatively stable compared to a multipolar 
system.9 
 The more stable the international system, the less uncertain and constrained the position 
of states will be within this system. As a result, since bipolar systems are more stable and impose 
fewer constraints on states than multipolar systems, the degree of state autonomy is also larger in 
bipolar systems than in multipolar systems. In the process of preference formation, this affects 
the weight a State is likely to attach to its international interests (which increases as state 
autonomy decreases) and the State’s ability to take account of its domestic interests in the process 
of preference formation (which increases as state autonomy increases). As a consequence, middle 
powers will be less concerned about their power position in a bipolar system than in a multipolar 
system.10 The probability then increases that the State will give precedence to its domestic 
interests – thus to domestic demands such as pressure exerted by interest groups - and that it will 
pay less attention to its international interests (e.g. pressure exerted by foreign states).  
Apart from the structural variable of external polarity, the process variable of state 
vulnerability also influences state autonomy. Increased pressure by other states is likely to result 
in increasing political costs for a state. The vulnerability of the state (comparable to the 
sensitivity of the government in the domestic arena) affects the degree to which state A needs to 
take account of the preferences of state B and thus the degree to which state A is likely to be 
influenced by state B. Asymmetries in dependence-as-vulnerability between states have 
consequences for the interactions between these states.11 If state A is more vulnerable to state B 
                                                 
9
 Moreover uncertainty and instability are also extremely high during periods of power transition, that is, when 
external polarity is actually changing (Bueno de Mesquita, 1978:455; Starr and Morton, 2001:51). 
10
 One exception needs to be mentioned though. This concerns middle powers which are not aligned with one of the 
superpowers. As these states are not integrated within competing blocks, they are at risk of serving as locations for 
superpower competition. 
11
 In the area of international trade for example: If state A exports a large part of its products to state B and state A  
has no alternative export markets, then state A is vulnerable to state B (Keohane and Nye, 1989:12-13). 
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than vice versa, then A is likely to anticipate on B’s wishes and expected behaviour. This has an 
impact on the costs and benefits state A attaches to different behavioural options in the process of 
preference-formation. In this situation it is clearly in state A’s interest not to upset state B, for the 
reaction of state B (e.g. retaliation) could seriously damage A’s political and economic interests. 
If state A has a high degree of vulnerability to other states, then its autonomy decreases and it 
will attach more weight to its external political interest than to its internal interests in the process 
of preference-formation.  
 
Hypotheses 
A number of expectations on state and governmental autonomy in preference formation on 
foreign policy can now be derived. 
 
• the lower the internal polarity, the lower the degree of governmental autonomy and the 
more importance a State will attach to its internal interests relative to its external interests; 
• the higher the internal polarity, the higher the degree of governmental autonomy and the 
more importance a State will attach to its external interests relative to its internal interests; 
• the higher the levels of societal resources and unidirectional mobilization, the lower the 
degree of governmental autonomy and the more likely a State is to take account of its 
internal political interest; 
• the greater a government’s sensitivity, the lower the degree of governmental autonomy 
and the more importance a State will attach to its internal political interests; 
• the lower the external polarity, the lower the degree of state autonomy and the more 
importance a State will attach to its external interests relative to its internal interest; 
• the higher external polarity, the higher the degree of state autonomy and the more 
importance a State will attach to its internal interest relative to its external interest;  
• the greater a State’s vulnerability vis-à-vis other states, the lower the degree of state 
autonomy and the more importance it will attach to its international political interest. 
 
These expectations can be summarized in a causal model, presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Causal model 
 
 
 
Combining the theoretical expectations based on the structural variables of internal and external 
polarity yields four possible combinations (Table 3). Box B – low internal polarity and high 
external polarity – depicts cases in which the State is confronted with relatively weak external 
constraints and strong internal constraints: the degree of state autonomy is high and the degree of 
governmental autonomy is low. This leads to the expectation that internal considerations will be 
decisive. Box C – high internal polarity and low external polarity – depicts cases in which the 
State is confronted with strong external constraints and relatively weak internal constraints: the 
degree of state autonomy is low and the degree of governmental autonomy is high. This generates 
the expectation that external considerations will be decisive. In cases in boxes A and D, the 
structural variables do not allow for clear-cut expectations on the primacy of either domestic or 
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international considerations. I expect that in these cases, the intervention of process variables will 
be decisive in tilting the balance towards either international or domestic considerations. Decision 
making in Box A takes place under loose constraints. The high degree of state autonomy allows 
for domestic politics to be taken into consideration, but the high degree of governmental 
autonomy takes away the necessity for the State to do so. Decision making is particularly difficult 
in cases in box D, as both governmental and state autonomy are low and internal and external 
considerations have to be taken into account here. The State will have to seek a compromise, 
which is likely to result in a long and tardy process of preference formation.  
 
Table 3: Polarity, autonomy and state preferences 
 
                                             Internal Polarity 
 
 
                     High                                                  Low 
                         
                       A 
High degree of state autonomy. 
High degree of governmental 
autonomy. 
No decisive effect of either domestic or 
international considerations: process 
variables gain in importance 
 
                        
                        B 
High degree of state autonomy. 
Low degree of governmental autonomy. 
Domestic considerations will be decisive  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
External 
Polarity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low 
                          
                       C 
Low degree of state autonomy. 
High degree of governmental 
autonomy. 
International considerations will be 
decisive 
 
                         
                        D 
Low degree of state autonomy. 
Low degree of governmental autonomy. 
No decisive effect of either domestic or 
international considerations: process 
variables gain in importance 
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III FRENCH AND GERMAN PREFERENCE FORMATION ON 
INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
 
This section will provide a preliminary empirical test of the theoretical framework elaborated 
above. Four cases will be studied, one from each box. By selecting France and Germany, 
variation on the variable of internal polarity (and thus governmental autonomy) is established. 
Internal polarity in Germany is relatively low.12 The degree of centralization of power in 
Germany is low, as it is a federalist state. Its score on Schmidt’s index of veto-points is high (5 
out of 5) (Schmidt, 1993:386-387). Furthermore, in the period of the case studies, Germany had a 
coalition government with a majority in the Bundestag, the lower chamber of parliament. In the 
Bundesrat, the upper chamber of parliament, the government had a stable majority until 1990 and 
a minority or very small majority from 1990 onwards (Saalfeld, 2005:64). Executive-legislative 
relations are therefore characterized by an executive-legislative balance until 1990 and are 
legislative dominated from 1990 onwards. Finally, Germany is characterized by a high 
institutionalization of interest mediation. Different indices of corporatism agree on the presence 
of modest to strong corporatism in Germany (Siaroff, 1999:180-184). In contrast with Germany, 
the French unitary state is highly centralized. France’s score on Schmidt’s index of veto-points is 
0 out of 5 (Schmidt, 1993:386-387). Nevertheless, between 1986 and 1988 and from 1993 
onwards, cohabitation between a Socialist President and a Centre-Right prime minister reduced 
the centralization of power. Furthermore, the Centre-Right government ruling France between 
1986 and 1988 enjoyed a majority in the Assemblée. The Socialist government from 1988 until 
March 1993 was a minority government and the Centre-Right government from March 1993 
onwards was a majority government again (Thiébault, 2004:338). Consequently, executive-
legislative relations were balanced between 1986 and 1988, legislative dominated between 1989 
and March 1993, and balanced again from March 1993 onwards. Different indices of corporatism 
indicate a low degree or even an absence of corporatism in France, although the indices are not as 
much in agreement on the degree of corporatism in France as they are on the degree of 
corporatism in Germany (Siaroff, 1999:180-184). On the basis of Table 2, Germany’s score on 
                                                 
12
 In this article, ‘Germany’ refers to the Federal Republic of Germany until 1990 and includes the ex-GDR from 
1991 onwards. 
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internal polarity varies between 1 until 1990 and 0 from 1990 onwards (both indicating low 
polarity) and France’s score is 2 (indicating high polarity).13  
Variation on the variable of external polarity is obtained by selecting, for both France and 
Germany, one preference formation process before and one after the end of the Cold War. The 
first case is the 1988 CAP-reform and the second case is the agricultural chapter in the Uruguay 
Round of GATT-negotiations between 1990 and 1993. The international system from the middle 
of 1950s up to and including 1989 can be classified as bipolar, with the United States and the 
Soviet Union being the two superpowers. In the beginning of the 1990s, after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union, scholars did not agree whether the international 
system was unipolar or multipolar. On the one hand, Mearsheimer (1990a) and Layne (1993) 
argued that the political international system was on its way to become multipolar, while 
Krauthammer (1990) argued that it was unipolar, with the US as hegemon. The period between 
1990 and 1993 appears to have been a period of transition, the outcome of which was not yet 
clear at the time. Since a period of power transition involves high degrees of uncertainty and 
instability, it most closely resembles what I classified as low external polarity, even though there 
is no agreement on whether the international system was in fact multipolar or not. Table 4 
provides an overview of the cases and how they are classified with respect to internal and 
external polarity. 
On the basis of the theoretical framework, it is first of all expected that as the German 
government enjoys a lower degree of governmental autonomy, it will be more guided by internal 
considerations than France. Furthermore, the expectation is that external considerations will gain 
relatively in importance in the period 1990-1993, compared to the period before 1990, as state 
autonomy increased. For each of the cases respectively, I will shortly elaborate on the 
consequences of the proposed policies for the state’s interests (political, economic, ideological), 
and on variations in the process variables during the decision-making process. Subsequently, the 
preferences defended by France and Germany in the international arena will be described, and in 
                                                 
13
 These classifications of France and Germany with respect to their internal polarity correspond with other author’s 
categorizations of state-society relations in these states.  State-society relations are generally considered to be 
society-dominated in Germany (leading to the expectation that domestic groups will be more influential) and state-
dominated in France (leading to the expectation that domestic groups will be less influential) ( e.g. Katzenstein, 
1978:323-234; Krasner, 1978:58; Mastanduno et al., 1989:470;  Risse-Kappen, 1991:492, 504: Skidmore, 1993:207; 
Van der Vleuten, 2001:87). 
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conclusion an analysis is provided of these preferences in the light of state and governmental 
autonomy and the relative influence of internal and external considerations. 
 
Table 4: Internal polarity, external polarity, and the four cases 
 
                                             Internal Polarity 
 
 
                     High                                                  Low 
                         
 
France: CAP-reform 1988 
                       
 
Germany: CAP-reform 1988 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
External 
Polarity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
 
Low 
                         
 
France: Uruguay Round 1990-1993 
                         
 
Germany: Uruguay Round 1990-1993 
 
 
The 1988 CAP-Reform 
In June 1987, the European Commission proposed a package of reforms aimed at safeguarding 
the financing of the EC-budget. An important part of this package was the introduction of the so-
called stabilizers, which imposed a ceiling on agricultural expenditure. This was deemed 
necessary, because the production quota, introduced in 1984, did not sufficiently limit 
agricultural expenditure to prevent budgetary problems.14  It took the Council of Ministers until 
February 1988 to reach agreement on the package of reforms. 
 
German interests and preferences  
 
There was a considerable amount of external political and economic pressure to reform the CAP. 
The Commission exerted intense pressure on the member states to agree to the proposed CAP-
reform, repeatedly pointing at the continuing budgetary deficits which were mainly caused by 
                                                 
14
 When production was to exceed a certain threshold, stabilizers would become operative, lowering the support 
prices with the same percentage as the excess production (de Groot, 1997:141). 
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agricultural expenditure. CAP-reform simply was a necessity. The United Kingdom (UK) and the 
Netherlands supported the Commission plans and tried to convince other member states to accept 
the proposals (De Groot, 1997:158). Domestically, however, societal pressure in Germany was 
mostly mobilized against the Commission proposal of introducing stabilizers. The Deutscher 
Bauernverband (DBV) categorically rejected the price reductions that the stabilizers were likely 
to give rise to and showed itself in favour of reducing the quantity of production instead, as well 
as setting aside land for this purpose (Deutscher Bauernverband, 1988:23). The stabilizers did not 
fit in well with the German idea of agricultural policy either, which focused on farm support 
through the price mechanism (Scotto, 1987; Lemaitre, 1987). High farm prices were 
indispensable for the price mechanism to generate sufficient income for German farmers. The 
stabilizers were thus both politically and ideologically costly for the German government. 
Furthermore, elections were scheduled for Baden-Württemberg and Schleswig-Holstein in 
September 1987, two Länder in which the farm vote was considered to be of importance (Elliot 
and Heath, 2000:44-45). Chancellor Helmut Kohl feared these elections would damage the 
majority of the coalition parties in the Bundesrat (Attali, 1995:426), and he warned Minister of 
Agriculture, Ignaz Kiechle, that these elections were important. 
 Germany was the only member state that categorically rejected the Commission proposals 
(de Groot, 1997:155). It rejected the stabilizers and submitted a wholly different proposal, which 
came down to national quota and national financing of support when these quotas were exceeded. 
Furthermore, Germany, together with France, proposed to introduce a set-aside scheme, as an 
alternative to the system of stabilizers (de Groot, 1997:155). Set-aside would limit production, 
which would eventually result in a decrease in expenditure on agriculture. This would be far 
more desirable than price cuts. At the European Council meeting in Copenhagen, December 
1987, Germany blocked the negotiations, because the Commission had not submitted proposals 
on set-aside. During its own presidency of the European Community, starting January 1988, 
Germany succeeded in getting a set-aside scheme accepted. Although set-aside eventually was 
not introduced as an alternative for, but in addition to the system of stabilizers, the high ceilings 
for expenditure combined with the set-aside limited their effects.  
 The German position defended in the international arena was in accordance with the 
preferences of the German farmers. Their pressure appears to have been effective, and the 
sensitivity of the German government due to the two Länder elections positively affected the 
Sovereign States and their Decision Making Autonomy ~ Gerry van der Kamp-Alons                      20 
societal influence. We may conclude that the German farm organization influenced German 
preference with regard to the 1988 CAP-reform (see also Hendriks, 1991; Patterson, 1997; Elliot 
and Heath, 2000). Domestic considerations turned out to be more important for the German 
government than international considerations. 
 
French interests and preferences  
 
Just like Germany, France was confronted with pressure from the Commission and several 
member states to agree to the proposed CAP-reform. It found an ally in Germany though, as both 
were interested in undermining the system of stabilizers. However, the German emphasis on 
limiting production and introducing set-aside did not correspond with the wishes of the French 
farmers and their idea of agricultural policy (Fouilleux, 1996:62-65). The farmers protested 
against the Commission proposals and against any European agricultural policy that was budget-
driven (Banzet, 1987). A complicating factor for the French government were the presidential 
elections which were to be held in March 1988. According to Attali (1995:426), the French 
government would not easily be able to make concessions. 
 In the negotiations in the Council of Ministers, France did not reject the Commission 
proposals altogether, but aimed at limiting the effects of the stabilizers. To that end, it proposed 
that the thresholds for production beyond which guarantee prices would be reduced, be 
introduced for a range of products together instead of per product (de Groot, 1997:143). This 
would allow excess production of one product to be leveled out by other products, for which the 
production had remained below the threshold. Together with Germany, France also proposed an 
initiative of optional set-aside. Eventually, France agreed to both the stabilizers per product and 
to set-aside, even though the Commission proposals on set-aside did not permit extensive cattle 
breeding on the land that was taken out of production, which France had desired (de Groot,1997: 
158). The farmers opposed the agreement on CAP-reform their government consented to and 
were angry at Farm Minister François Guillaume, because he had introduced the proposal for set-
aside in the negotiations (Fottorino, 1988:1). 
 The French position taken in the negotiations in the Council of Ministers was not in 
accordance with the wishes of the French farmers. The government’s efforts to minimize the 
effects of the stabilizers were not contrary to the French farm interests, but the farmers had 
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wanted the government to reject the Commission proposals altogether. Furthermore, the 
government proposed a set-aside scheme, even though the French farmers strongly opposed the 
idea of set-aside or any other kind of production-limiting policies. Even if one takes into account 
the possibility that the French government supported the set-aside proposal in order to strengthen 
the Franco-German alliance against the stabilizers and to create a bargaining chip which could be 
exchanged for concessions by others, then still the choice for the set-aside proposal indicates that 
farm pressure had no decisive impact on the government. References to the government’s ‘tied 
hands’, due to the presidential elections, were aimed at gaining concessions from other states in 
the negotiations, but cannot be regarded indicative of societal influence. 
  
The Uruguay Round Between 1990 and 1993 
Within the Uruguay Round of GATT-negotiations (1986 and 1993) agriculture was an important 
issue. Particularly between 1990 and 1993, substantial proposals and potential accords on the 
agricultural aspects of the Uruguay Round were discussed. In the autumn of 1990, the European 
Commission proposed an agricultural offer in the run up to the GATT ministerial conference in 
Heysel, which the Council of Ministers had to approve. The Heysel conference, originally 
intended to finalize the GATT-negotiations, turned into a debacle however, and it took until 
November 1992 for the European Commission and the US-government to reach a compromise on 
agriculture: the Blair House Accord. However, this compromise was not acceptable to all 
member states. After additional negotiations and concessions, both the US and all European 
member states could agree on a deal on agriculture that introduced several changes to the Blair 
House Accord in December 1993. 
 
German interests and preferences 
 
Between 1990 and 1993, the EC was under intense external pressure from other GATT-members, 
particularly the United States and the so-called CAIRNS-group of cereal-exporting states, to 
liberalize agricultural trade (Europe, 20.9.1990:10, 19.10.1990:12). Within the EC, however, 
France tried to convince Germany to persist with its tough stance regarding the agricultural issue. 
Germany thus found itself in a difficult position, since it, on the one hand, highly valued the 
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Franco-German axis in the process of European integration, but, on the other hand, also attached 
great importance to its relations with other trading partners, like the US (Bulletin, 24.2.1987: 
139-143). Moreover, by the end of 1991, it became increasingly clear that Germany’s overall 
economic interest was better served by a swift and successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. 
Beneficial agreements had been reached on many non-agricultural topics (CDU/CSU/FDP, 
1991:12; Paeman and Bensch, 1995:195), and due to the so called ‘globality’ of the negotiations, 
the concessions made by trading partners on these non-agricultural issues would not materialize 
until agreement was reached on the outstanding issues, among which agriculture. Since Germany, 
as an important exporter of industrial goods, would economically benefit from these concessions, 
it became increasingly costly to continue prioritizing particularistic agricultural interests, which 
blocked an overall GATT-agreement. Furthermore, as time went by, the US threatened to 
prioritize bilateral cooperation if the GATT-negotiations were to collapse (Gegenschlag aus 
Amerika, 1991; GATT-Verhandlungen, 1991). This could seriously damage the multilateral trade 
regime, the importance of which Germany had repeatedly emphasized before and during the 
negotiations (e.g. Bulletin, 12.6.1987:512-513). We may conclude that, particularly from 1991 
onwards, both the German external political and particularly its economic interests were 
increasingly served by flexibilizing the European offer on agriculture, which enhanced the 
chances of successfully concluding the Uruguay Round. 
 Domestically, nevertheless, German farmers demanded protection and mobilized pressure 
against a far-reaching European agricultural offer in 1990 and against the Blair House Accord in 
1992. In 1991 industrial interest groups also stepped up their pressure on the government to make 
concessions on agriculture in exchange for concessions of trading partners on industrial trade 
(Patterson, 1997:153). The mostly unidirectional mobilization against agricultural concessions in 
1990 had made way for a multidirectional societal mobilization in 1991. Furthermore, the 
German government was facing the first all-German elections in December 1990. Governmental 
sensitivity was therefore high, particularly taking into consideration that farmers were generally 
considered an important source of support for the government coalition of CDU, CSU and FDP 
(Weiss, 1989:80-81).   
 With respect to the negotiations on the European agricultural offer for the Heysel 
conference in the autumn of 1990, Germany staunchly defended the German agricultural interest 
in the Council meetings (Agra Europe, 19.13.1990:3; Europe, 10.10.1990:7; Swinbank an 
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Tanner, 1996:78). It rejected the Commission proposals for a 30% cut in agricultural support. By 
the end of 1991, however, the German Cabinet decided to opt for flexibilization of the 
agricultural offer. The German preference ordering had changed: a successful conclusion of the 
GATT-negotiations was now prioritized over defending particularistic farm interests. In 
accordance with these priorities, Germany also accepted the Blair House Accord agreed to by the 
European Commission and the US in November 1992, despite fierce French protests against this 
deal (Bulletin, 25.11.1992:1151). In August 1993, however, Chancellor Kohl made a statement to 
the press – after a meeting with the French president François Mitterrand – indicating that 
Germany also had problems with the Blair House Accord (Webber, 1998:52). Although German 
government officials went out of their way to convince their negotiating partners that the German 
position on Blair House had not changed, Kohl now instructed the German negotiators to 
concede to the French as much as possible, however, without jeopardizing the Uruguay Round. 
This resulted in German support for the French demand of ‘clarification’ of the Blair House 
Accord in September 1993, which eventually resulted in partial renegotiations, leading to an 
overall GATT-deal in December 1993. 
 Until the end of 1990, the position defended by the German government reflected the 
demands of the German farm lobby. The German demand for flexibilization of the European 
agricultural offer in 1991, however, and its acceptance of the Blair House Accord in 1992, appear 
to have been instigated by external considerations. The process variables of the degree of societal 
mobilization and governmental sensitivity explain why the German government chose to 
prioritize its internal political interests in 1990, but not in 1991 and 1992. In 1990, the upcoming 
parliamentary elections and the unidirectional societal mobilization against agricultural 
concessions, made the policy option of a far-reaching agricultural offer extremely costly, whereas 
an absence of both unified societal mobilization and crucial elections enabled the government to 
prioritize a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round over protecting particularistic farm 
interests in 1991 and 1992.  In 1993 though, Germany indirectly protected farm interests again, 
by supporting the French demands for ‘clarification’ of the Blair House Accord. Nevertheless, it 
is striking that this time, these preferences do not seem to have been driven by domestic pressure 
of the farm lobby, but by external political pressure exerted by France.  
 
French interests and preferences 
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Similar to Germany, France faced the political pressure from GATT-members and the European 
Commission to liberalize agricultural trade. By the end of 1991, even German support was failing 
and France became increasingly isolated within the EC. It was also feared that the discord within 
the EC (particularly between Germany and France), would have repercussions on the process of 
European integration. Regarding the French economic interests, a GATT-agreement would 
arguably be beneficial for the overall economy, although an agreement would be relatively more 
favourable to an industrial exporting state like Germany. However, France repeatedly 
downplayed the agreements reached on non-agricultural issues, as well as the benefits an overall 
GATT-deal was likely to provide (Coded message from the Dutch permanent representation in 
Brussels to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8.12.1992). With respect to France’s external 
ideological interests, accepting a far-reaching agricultural offer and giving in to US demands 
were costly policy options. France’s vocation exportatrice regarding agricultural products (cf. 
Fouilleux, 1996:52), and its inclination for interventionist policies were at stake as the proposals 
denied the ‘right’ to export, making potential exports increasingly dependent on relative 
competitiveness and the operation of the market mechanism. Furthermore, giving in to US 
demands and accepting deals more favourable to the US than to the EC, could jeopardize the role 
France saw for the EC as a counterweight against the US (cf. Gyomarch et al., 1998:40-43). The 
only ideological consideration supporting readiness to compromise was the importance France 
attached to the Franco-German axis (cf. Delorme, 1994:42).  
 Domestically, the variable of internal political pressure was nearly a constant. Farmers 
protested against a far-reaching European agricultural offer and against flexibilization of this 
offer at later stages in the negotiations. Although societal mobilization of other groups (e.g. 
industrial groups) in favour of concessions in the agricultural negotiations in order to arrive at a 
successful GATT-deal had increased somewhat by the end of the Uruguay Round, societal 
pressure mainly supported the French farmers. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the socialist 
government was considerable in the autumn of 1992. The French government had only narrowly 
escaped a no-vote in the referendum on the Treaty on European Union in September 1992. In 
addition, parliamentary elections would be held in March 1993, and the governing Socialist party 
did not do well in the polls.  
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 Between 1990 and 1993, France continuously stalled decision-making in the EC on 
flexibilization of the agricultural offer. In 1990, France rejected the Commission’s agricultural 
proposal for the Heysel conference. In 1992, France objected to the Blair House Accord, 
threatening to use its veto-power if necessary (Noblecourt, 1992:1). Finally, in 1993, France 
demanded ‘renegotiation’ of the Blair House Accord. This resulted in a new Accord in December 
1993, which France accepted, even though the material changes appeared to be minimal.  
With the exception of the acceptance of the final deal in December 1993, the preferences 
defended by France coincide with the demands of the French farm organizations. At the same 
time however, these preferences are in line with the French external ideological interests, though 
less with its external political interests from 1991 onwards. The question that needs to be 
answered now is whether the French government acted on the basis of domestic political 
considerations or on the basis of external, mainly ideological considerations. I would argue that 
the French government based its actual preferences on external considerations and used the 
societal mobilization to support their ‘tied hands’ strategy as a means to gain maximal 
concessions from its partners. The chances of effective farm influence appear to have been small 
for two reasons. First of all, the relations between government and farm organizations had 
deteriorated between 1991 and 1993. Agriculture Minister Louis Mermaz agreed to CAP-reform 
in 1992, against the demands of the farm organizations and without informing or consulting them 
(Fouilleux, 1996: 56-59). He perceived CAP-reform as a means of strengthening the position of 
the EC in international negotiations (Grosrichard, 1991:21). Strengthening the leverage of the EC 
at the international level seemed more important to him than satisfying the farmers. The farm 
organizations were aware of their lack of influence and deemed it necessary to establish contacts 
with other Ministries (Fouilleux, 1996:62-65). Secondly, decision-making with respect to the 
GATT-negotiations took place at the upper echelons of the executive during this period, limiting 
the access of the farm organizations (Epstein, 1997:361). 
Contrary to internal political considerations, external considerations do explain French 
preferences, including the acceptance of the final deal. In 1991 and 1992, France’s vocation 
exportatrice and the role of the EC as a counterweight to the US were at stake. Although the final 
agreement reached in December 1993 was still likely to damage French exports, the agreement 
was less costly than the previous proposals. It was clear this agreement was ‘as good as it gets’, 
and the only alternative was no agreement at all, which would leave France worse off.  French 
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opposition against the agreement would also have repercussions on the Franco-German axis, and 
it would risk a European crisis (Webber, 1998:52). Rejecting the agreement became increasingly 
hard to defend internationally. Finally, the French government appears to have been confident 
that the final deal – even though the material changes relative to the Blair House Accord were 
minimal and certainly not sufficient to meet the demands of the farm organizations – could be 
defended domestically. The cuts in export subsidies had been decreased and the US had made 
concessions. The government could therefore claim that it had resisted US pressure and that the 
French vocation exportatrice had not been squandered. France, indeed, took every opportunity to 
emphasize how much it had won in the negotiations (e.g. Ministère de l’agriculture et de la 
pêche, 1994).  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The investigation in German and French preference formation with regard to the 1988 CAP-
reform and the agricultural part of the Uruguay Round of GATT-negotiations between 1990 and 
1993 has shown differences in the relative influence of internal and external considerations. 
German resistance against the CAP-reform proposed by the Commission was based on domestic 
considerations, reflecting the wishes of the German farm organizations. France also seemed 
committed to protect the interests of its farmers and tried to undermine the proposed system of 
stabilizers to that end. However, the fact that it (together with Germany) introduced and finally 
accepted set-aside – a policy the French farm organizations fiercely opposed – shows that the 
French farm groups had no decisive impact on their government during the negotiations. With 
respect to the agricultural part of the Uruguay Round between 1990 and 1993, the German 
government, confronted with domestic mobilization against compromising on the agricultural 
chapter and facing parliamentary elections in December 1990, first succumbed to domestic 
pressure. From 1991 onwards, however, in the absence of unified societal mobilization and 
crucial elections, Germany prioritized external political and economic considerations and agreed 
to agricultural concessions. The preferences defended by France between 1990 and 1993 largely 
coincided with both the demands of the French farm organizations and the incentives based on 
external ideological considerations. The investigation has shown that the latter offer a convincing 
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explanation of the French preferences in this period, whereas direct evidence for farm influence is 
lacking. Taken together, these cases demonstrate how internal polarity and external polarity 
affect governmental autonomy and state autonomy respectively and how this translates in the 
relative influence of international and domestic considerations in the foreign policy process. 
Under conditions of low internal polarity and high external polarity (Germany 1988), the degree 
of state autonomy was high while the degree of governmental autonomy was low and societal 
demands prevailed in the process of preference formation. In contrast, under conditions of high 
internal polarity and low external polarity (France 1990-1993) external interests were prioritized. 
The German case between 1990 and 1993 (low internal polarity, low external polarity) 
convincingly showed the decisive influence of process factors when both the degrees of state 
autonomy and governmental autonomy are low. 
 We may conclude that the case studies provide support for the hypotheses derived from 
the theoretical framework presented in this article. Further rigorous testing of the model will be 
necessary in order to arrive at more robust conclusions regarding its predictive accuracy. Even 
though states enjoy decision making authority in nearly all foreign policy domains, they cannot 
simply act on policies of their own design but are constrained by both international and societal 
actors: their decision making autonomy is limited. Application of a rigorous distinction between 
state autonomy and governmental autonomy enabled predictions on the relative influence of 
international and domestic actors on state preferences and policies. If lower degrees of autonomy 
should also be regarded as indicative of lower degrees of sovereignty remains a matter of 
definition. Nevertheless, the importance of the degrees of state and governmental autonomy in 
the analysis of ‘who rules’ in particular empirical domains is a matter of fact. 
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